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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 The appellants in this case, Owen Rogal, D.D.S. and his 
professional corporation (collectively, "Dr. Rogal"), appeal from 
an order of the district court imposing sanctions pursuant to its 
inherent power in the amount of $256,360.  This amount represents 
the defendants' attorneys' fees for trial and trial preparation 
and one-half of the fees incurred in preparing their motion for 
sanctions.  Because we conclude that the district court erred in 
declining to hold an evidentiary hearing in connection with the 
motion for sanctions, we reverse the district court's order and 
remand the matter to allow the district court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
I. 
 Dr. Rogal is a Philadelphia dentist specializing in the 
treatment of temporomandibular joint disorder (more commonly 
known as "TMJ"), and specifically in the diagnosis and treatment 
of "mandibular whiplash," i.e., TMJ caused by automobile 
accidents.  In 1989, Dr. Rogal was the subject of a critical 
story that was presented on defendant American Broadcasting 
Companies' ("ABC") news magazine program "20/20" and reported by 
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defendant John Stossel.  In brief, the story highlighted the 
aggressive advertising materials disseminated by Dr. Rogal to 
personal injury lawyers, the controversial nature of his concept 
of "mandibular whiplash," and other dentists' doubts about his 
diagnoses of the condition.  The story suggested that Dr. Rogal's 
practice may have been motivated principally by a desire to 
extract money from insurance companies. 
 Dr. Rogal subsequently sued ABC and Mr. Stossel for 
defamation and false light invasion of privacy in Illinois state 
court.  The case was removed to the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred the case 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1404 in July 1989.  In December 1992, after a trial in which the 
defendants rested after the plaintiffs' case, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the defendants. 
 After the jury had been excused, the district court 
directed counsel for ABC to "review the record and document your 
contentions with respect to your motion for sanctions," adding: 
"I would like to look them over myself."  App. 1387.  ABC 
submitted a motion seeking sanctions against Dr. Rogal and his 
lead trial attorney, M. Mark Mendel, pursuant to the court's 
inherent power.  The motion alleged that Dr. Rogal had repeatedly 
given false testimony at trial and that Mr. Mendel had disobeyed 
court orders regarding post-verdict contact with jurors by 
investigators and had committed numerous violations of ethical 
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and legal standards concerning closing arguments.1  Dr. Rogal's 
attorneys filed a lengthy brief in opposition to the motion, App. 
1458-1605, as well as a reply memorandum.  App. 1667-73.  The 
district court granted ABC's motion, noting that, under Chambers 
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), it had "the inherent power to 
impose sanctions upon parties and their attorneys where they 
engage in bad faith conduct which abuses the judicial process," 
App. 1676.  The court detailed ten separate subject areas in 
which it found that Dr. Rogal had testified falsely.  App. 1679-
89.  In each of these areas, the court concluded that Dr. Rogal's 
testimony was directly contradicted by his own words or 
advertisements or by the testimony of his own witnesses.  Id.  
 A sampling of the district court's findings will serve 
to illustrate the breadth of Dr. Rogal's alleged 
misrepresentations.  One subject area cited by the district court 
concerned Dr. Rogal's use of the notation "D•" on patient 
examination forms.  The district court noted that Dr. Rogal had 
initially testified that this notation meant that the patient's 
symptoms were "decreased."  The next day, however, after being 
shown out-takes of the examination of a patient on whose form Dr. 
Rogal had written "D•" but who said in the out-takes that most of 
her symptoms were absent, Dr. Rogal stated that he had used "D•" 
to denote "absent."  He made this statement even though the 
                                                           
1The district court eventually sanctioned Mr. Mendel by ordering 
him to pay the defendants $13,573, an amount that represented 
one-half of the fees that they incurred in preparing their motion 
for sanctions, and also directed the Clerk to forward the court's 
sanctions opinion to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania.  App. 1938.  Mr. Mendel did not file an appeal. 
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examination form stated that "A = Absent" and even though, when a 
reimbursement form was submitted to an insurer for a patient with 
"D•" notations on his or her examination form, the reimbursement 
forms stated that the symptoms were "decreased."  This practice, 
the court found, enabled Dr. Rogal to continue administering (and 
billing for) numerous additional treatments and increased the 
settlement value of the patient's personal injury lawsuit by 
allowing the patient to claim (falsely) that the injury was 
permanent.  App. 1679-81. 
 In several other subject areas, the district court 
found that Dr. Rogal had contradicted his own answers to 
interrogatories and to requests for admissions, as well as his 
own deposition testimony, when he testified at trial.  The 
subjects of this testimony included Dr. Rogal's income, a dispute 
between Dr. Rogal and state licensing authorities, Dr. Rogal's 
examination of Mr. Stossel, and his reasons for agreeing to be 
interviewed by 20/20.  App. 1682-85. 
 The district court also noted contradictions regarding 
the way in which Dr. Rogal held himself out to the public. 
According to the district court, Dr. Rogal denied ever 
advertising himself as Dr. Owen Rogal without adding that he was 
a dentist rather than a physician.  However, his own promotional 
materials and advertisements frequently omitted any reference to 
"D.D.S." and his instructions to office personnel regarding 
telephone calls from prospective patients urged them to refer to 
him as a "doctor" and a "physician."  App. 1688. 
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 After the court scheduled a hearing to determine the 
nature of the sanction to be imposed, Dr. Rogal retained new 
counsel.  Dr. Rogal's new lawyers filed motions seeking a vacatur 
of the sanctions order, an evidentiary hearing, and a continuance 
of the hearing.  The court continued the disposition of the 
motion until it had received new briefing from Dr. Rogal's new 
lawyers, App. 1723-29, but decided that an evidentiary hearing 
was not necessary for due process purposes, since the 
sanctionable conduct had taken place in court.  App. 1727-28. Dr. 
Rogal's new lawyers filed a lengthy brief, with numerous 
exhibits.  App. 1730-1914. 
 After receiving these submissions and hearing argument, 
the court again rejected Dr. Rogal's request for an evidentiary 
hearing to explain his trial testimony.  App. 1929.  The court 
subsequently issued the order imposing sanctions against Dr. 
Rogal.  The court restated its rationale for refusing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing, noting that "[t]he actionable conduct took 
place in the presence of the court and is documented by the 
record," and that "[d]uring the trial, plaintiffs had every 
opportunity to explain and attempt to justify the numerous 
inconsistencies and contradictions" in Dr. Rogal's testimony. 
District Court Order of September 27, 1994 at 1.  Dr. Rogal's 
motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed. 
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II. 
 We review a district court's determinations regarding 
the imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion.  Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. at 55; Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994); cf. 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399-405 (1990) 
(Rule 11); Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(factual determinations, legal conclusions, and choice of 
sanction under Rule 11 receive "substantial deference").  An 
abuse of discretion in this context would occur if the district 
court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a 
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Simmerman, 27 F.3d 
at 63 (quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405); Westinghouse, 43 
F.3d at 75. 
 On appeal, Dr. Rogal argues that the district court 
committed three separate reversible errors:  declining to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to allow Dr. Rogal to explain the apparent 
contradictions in his testimony; failing to assure that Dr. Rogal 
was informed of the conflict of interest that allegedly arose 
between him and his attorney when ABC sought sanctions against 
both of them; and failing to make an explicit finding of bad 
faith on the part of Dr. Rogal.  Dr. Rogal also argues that on 
remand the case should be reassigned to a different district 
court judge. 
 
III. 
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 The imposition of monetary sanctions by a court 
implicates fundamental notions of due process and thus requires 
"fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record." 
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980); see 
also Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 
540 (3d Cir. 1985); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 
570 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[A]s a general practice a monetary detriment 
should not be imposed by a court without prior notice and some 
occasion to respond.").  Here, there is no dispute that Dr. Rogal 
had fair notice of the possibility of sanctions.  The issue 
before us is whether the required "opportunity for a hearing on 
the record" should have included an evidentiary hearing at which 
Dr. Rogal would have had the opportunity to explain the apparent 
contradictions and inconsistencies in his testimony. 
 We have repeatedly emphasized that the requirements of 
due process are not reducible to a static formula, but rather are 
sensitive to the facts and circumstances of a given case.  While 
"the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[,] the 
concept is flexible, calling for procedural protection as 
dictated by the particular circumstance."  Kahn v. United States, 
753 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).  The determination of the appropriate 
form of procedural protection requires "an evaluation of all the 
circumstances and an accommodation of competing interests.  The 
individual's right to fairness must be respected as must the 
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court's need to act quickly and decisively."  Eash, 757 F.2d at 
570 (citations omitted). 
 In Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat. Corp, 899 F.2d 1350 (3d 
Cir. 1990), where sanctions had been imposed under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, we had occasion to address the 
requirements of due process in a context similar to that 
presented here.  Eschewing "any rigid rule[, which] would, to say 
the least, be undesirable,"  we recognized that "[t]he 
circumstances must dictate what is required."  Id. at 1358.  We 
therefore announced a flexible rule under which 
a district court in the sound exercise of its 
discretion must identify and determine the legal basis 
for each sanction charge sought to be imposed, and 
whether its further resolution requires further 
proceedings, including the need for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
Id. at 1359.  Under the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case before us, we conclude that the imposition of sanctions 
against Dr. Rogal without holding an evidentiary hearing was not 
consistent with sound exercise of the district court's 
discretion. 
 Our holding is a narrow one and depends heavily on the 
specific nature of Dr. Rogal's alleged misrepresentations and the 
relationship of each instance of contradictory or inconsistent 
testimony to the central issues of the litigation.  We recognize 
that in many instances in which sanctionable conduct occurs in 
the court's presence, no hearing is required.  Cf. Kapco Mfg. Co. 
v. C & O Enterprises, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1495 (7th Cir. 1989). 
However, the present appeal presents an instance in which, 
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despite the fact that the sanctionable conduct took place in 
court, "a hearing could [have] assist[ed] the court in its 
decision."  Id.  This is so because we do not entirely agree with 
the district court's conclusion that "[d]uring the trial, 
plaintiffs had every opportunity to explain and attempt to 
justify the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions" in Dr. 
Rogal's testimony.  District Court Order of September 27, 1994 at 
1.   
 Given the nature of the disputed testimony, we are 
persuaded by Dr. Rogal's contention that he did not have the same 
incentive at trial to try to clear up all of the apparent 
contradictions  and inconsistencies in his testimony or to try to 
show his good faith as he would have had at an evidentiary 
hearing on the question of sanctions.  At trial, Dr. Rogal was 
attempting to prove that the defendants had committed the torts 
of defamation and false light invasion of privacy.  In order to 
prove these claims, it was not necessary for him to establish the 
truth of every one of the matters asserted in the portions of his 
testimony that the district court found to be false or 
misleading, and as a matter of trial strategy his attorneys might 
well have concluded that trying to clear up all of these points 
might have unduly diverted the jury's attention from Dr. Rogal's 
own claims.  To be sure, Dr. Rogal's credibility was undoubtedly 
an important factor at trial, and we assume that his attorneys 
were concerned about seeming inconsistencies and contradictions 
that undermined his credibility.  Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that their interest in clearing up apparent inconsistences and 
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contradictions and in demonstrating their client's good faith was 
different in some potentially significant respects at the trial 
from what it would have been at an evidentiary hearing focused 
squarely on the question whether Dr. Rogal gave false or 
misleading testimony and acted in bad faith. 
 It may well be that at an evidentiary hearing Dr. 
Rogal's attorneys could not have done any better in attempting to 
rehabilitate him than they did at trial, but we conclude that the 
dictates of due process require that they be given that chance. 
At least on reconsideration, Dr. Rogal's attorneys expressly and 
strenuously sought a hearing and made a proffer of the evidence 
they would introduce.  We recognize that the district court, in 
ruling on these requests, did not have the benefit of a precedent 
from our court specifically requiring a hearing under these 
circumstances, and in the absence of such a precedent we can 
understand why the court ruled as it did.  We now hold, however, 
that under the circumstances of this case, an evidentiary hearing 
should be held to allay due process concerns.  The evidence cited 
in the district court's opinion, unless rebutted, is sufficient 
to show that Dr. Rogal gave false or misleading testimony and 
proceeded in bad faith.  Dr. Rogal should, however, be given the 
opportunity to rebut the inferences that the district court drew 
from this evidence.  See Healy v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 
F.2d 611, 617 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 In light of our conclusion that the current award of 
sanctions should be vacated and that the case should be remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing, we need not decide whether, as Dr. 
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Rogal argues, the district court was obligated to advise him of a 
potential conflict of interest with his former attorney, Mr. 
Mendel, before deciding whether sanctions should be imposed on 
either or both of them.  On remand, Dr. Rogal will be represented 
by new counsel.  We also need not decide whether, as Dr. Rogal 
asserts, the current award of sanctions is defective because the 
district court did not say in so many words that it found that 
Dr. Rogal acted in bad faith.  We have no reason to assume that 
the court on remand will not make an express finding one way or 
the other on this question. 
 Several other arguments raised by Dr. Rogal should be 
addressed at this time, however, because they concern matters 
that may well arise on remand.  None of these arguments, however, 
requires extended discussion.  First, contrary to Dr. Rogal's 
suggestion, the district court, in order to sanction Dr. Rogal 
for "bad faith" conduct under Chambers based on his trial 
testimony, need not apply the standards that would be applicable 
at a criminal trial for perjury.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993); Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 
352 (1973).  Dr. Rogal cites no precedent holding that these 
standards must be applied in his context, and we are aware of 
none.  Under Chambers, what is required is a determination that 
the party acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons."  501 U.S. at 45-46. 
 Second, contrary to Dr. Rogal's argument, should the 
district court on remand again determine that Dr. Rogal's trial 
testimony was pervasively false or misleading and that he acted 
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in bad faith, an award of sanctions comparable in amount to the 
award now before us would not be excessive.  See Chambers, 501 
U.S. at 56; Maddox v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 723 F. Supp. 
1246, 1249-50 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 
1267 (E.D. Ky. 1986). 
 Finally, we see no basis whatsoever for Dr. Rogal's 
argument that this case should be assigned on remand to a 
different district court judge.  Such reassignments are ordered 
only "infrequently and with the greatest reluctance," Nobel v. 
Morchesky, 697 F.2d 97, 103 n.11 (3d Cir. 1982), and we see no 
ground for doing so here.  Contrary to Dr. Rogal's assertions, 
the record contains no evidence that the district judge developed 
a "bias" against him.  We recognize that the district court drew 
certain conclusions regarding Dr. Rogal's testimony from the 
record evidence and that on remand the judge will be required to 
give fair reconsideration to those conclusions in light of the 
new evidence that Dr. Rogal wishes to present.  We have no doubt, 
however, that the judge can and will do so.  Nor is the amount of 
the sanction imposed on Dr. Rogal by itself a reason to question 
the district court's impartiality.  To the contrary, the district 
court was reacting to what it perceived as repeated and serious 
instances of false testimony on the part of Dr. Rogal.  We thus 
see no ground for ordering reassignment. 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district 
court's order imposing sanctions against Dr. Rogal, and we remand 
the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
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